INTRODUCTION
O VER the last several decades, the Justices of the United States Supreme Court have issued an increasing number of separate opinions. It is not at all uncommon fo r there to be three or more opinions in a single case, particularly when controversial issues are decided. Nor is this tendency limited to the Supreme Court.
1 One sees similar, though less dramatic, trends in appellate courts throughout the country.
Things were not always this way. In the early years of the Supreme Court, John Marshall quite deliberately rejected the English tradition of issuing seriatim opinions and helped to establish a practice of producing a single opinion in each case. 2 IVIany observers believe that speaking with a single voice greatly ·Associate Professor o f Law, Te mp le Un ivers ity. I am gra teful to Michael Dool ey, Mik e Klarman, Saul Levmo re, Jim Lin dgren , Geoff Mi ll e r, E d Rock, Max Stearns, and Ted White for helpful commen ts and co nv ersations, an d owe special th a nk s to Chief Justice Norman Veasey, Ju stice Randy Holl a nd and Delaware Supreme Co urt Adm inistrator Steve Taylor for extre mely hel pfu l disc ussions on the workings of Delaware's supreme court. T hey of course should no t be see n as endorsing any o f the vi e ws I set forth in th e Artic le . I wou ld also iik e to thank the Olin Foundation for ge ne rous funding during a semeste r visitorshi p at th e U niv e rsity of Virginia School o f Law a nd Temple Law Schoo! for gene rous summer funding.
1 T hroughout th e Articl e, I ca pitali ze "Supre me Court" a nd "Court" when referring to the U nited States Supreme Co urt , an d I use lower case whe n referring to th e Delawa re "supreme court" in order to minimize co nfu sion. Likewise, I capitalize "J ustice" when referring to me mbers of the Supreme Co urt , !:l nd use the lowe r case "justice" when referring to members of the supreme court.
2 See, e.g., Herbert A. Johnson, Introduction: T he Busine ss of the Court, in 2 The O liver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supre me Court of the United States: Foundations of Power: Jo hn Marsha ll, 1801 -15 , at 373, 380-81 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1981 ; Meredith Kolsky, Note, Justice William Johnson and the History of the Supre me Court Dissent, 83 Geo. L. J. 2069,2073-75 (1995) .
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enhanced the credibility of a Court that h ad previously been dismissed as ineffectu al an d blatantly political. 3 Although the strong pattern of unanimity had weakened somewhat by th e end of M arshall's tenure as Chief Justice , 4 the writing of sep arate opinions was discouraged on many appellate courts throughou t the nineteenth centu ry and into the early twentieth century. Onl y if a judge fe lt extraordinarily strongly about an issue was he likely to write separately. By the 1940s, the picture looked entirely differ ent , with judges authoring separate opinions almost as a matter of course, particularly in cases that rai sed controversial issues. 5 Thus, when the Supreme Court made a point of issuing unanimous decisions in several important desegregation cases, 6 the Court's unanimity seemed all the more striking.
3 See Kolsky, supra note 2 , a t 2075-76 (reviewing commentators).
-' Justice W illi a m Johnson is often cited as ha ving reintroduced no nunanimity in the Supre me Court. Jo hnson was appo inted by Presid e nt Jefferso n, who stro ngl y opposed the Supreme Court's practi ce of un a nimity, a nd who urged John so n to write separately. Id . at 2078-79; see also Le tter fro m T ho mas J efferso n to William John so n (Oct. 27, 1822), in 12 The Works Of T homas J effe rso n 246, 249-50 (PaulL. Forded ., 1905) (contending that se riatim opinions are far mo re effective a t holdin g judges individuall y acco unta bl e, beca us e judges can hid e b e hind the fa<;ade of un a nimous opinions).
5 There is no obvious e xp la nation as to why th e urge fo r un a nimity di sappeared . A t th e Supreme Co urt leve l, it seems lik e ly that the increasing complexity of th e issues that made th eir way to th e Court may have bee n o ne factor, and that th e de clin e and eventual rejection of natural law th eories was a no th e r. See, e .g., Karl M. ZoBe l! , Division o f Opini o n in the Supre me Court: A History of Judici al D isi ntegrati o n, 44 Cornell L.Q. 186, 202-03 (1959) (s ugges ting that a side effect of Hol mes' role in the " destructio n of the myth of judicia l ce rta inty" was the creation of th e id ea that each judge 's view of a case is equally plausib le , which encouraged th e proliferation of separa te opini ons) . For ev idence of the magn itude of the shift in th e Supreme Court, see id . at 205 tbl. I (showing that onl y 11% of th e Co urt's opinions in 1930 were non unanimo us, but that thi s percentage rose to we ll over half by 1943, and was over 70% for most o f the 1950s). 6 In Brown v. Board of Ed uca ti on, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) , C hi ef Justi ce Warren succeeded in pers uadi ng all of the members of the Court to join his opinion reversin g the "sepa rate but eq ual " doctrin e of Ple ss y v. Fe rgus on, 163 U.S. 537 (1 896) . A nd , in Coope r v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) , th e Justices iss ued a coa uthored , unanimous opini o n reaffirming th eir commitme nt to B rown in the fa ce o f overt resist a nce in Arka nsas . T he J ustices viewed un a nimity as crucial to underscoring th e ir commitme nt to desegregatio n, a nd to heading off the risk tha t recalcitrant Southern sta tes wou ld seize on a di ssent as a mea ns o f co ntinuing the ir oppositi o n. Perhaps th e best acco unt of Chi ef Justice Warre n 's effort s to insure unanimity in Bro wn , and of th e percei ved importance of prese nting a united front , is Richard Kluger, Simple Justice:
The proliferation of separate opinions has produced a great deal of hand-wringing in some q uarters. Critics of the apparent fragmentation insist that writing sep arately tends to unde rmine the collegiality of a court and, at its worst, can erode the legitimacy of the court's pro:nouncem ents. 7 Other com m e nt ators, although emphasizing the need to main tain j1·dicial civility, h ave defended the value of se-oarate ooin ions . These critics ar 0 o-ue " "
that dissenting and concurring o pinions force the rn aj ority to sharpen its focus, and can si£mal both ĩhe limitations of the rna-
jority's analysis and the lik eli hood th at the decision will , or at least may, be overruled at a later date .
8
What neither the critics nor the pr oponents of writing separately have notice d is that an important state supreme co urt stands in striking contrast to the current pattern. The D elaware supreme court, which has long been recognized as our preeminent authority on state corporation law, rarely issues separate opinions. Even on deeply controversial issues, such as those that arose during the takeover wave of the 1980s, Delaware 's justices almost invariably speak with a single voice.
Although it is perhaps understandable that Supreme Court scholars have not noticed the Delaware supreme court's penchant for unanimity, corporate law scholars seem not to have picked up on it either. Corporate law commentators have analyzed and debated Delaware 's role in corporate law for decades, T he History of Brown v. Board of E du cacion a nd Black America's Struggle fo r E quality 679-99 (1975) . For another example of Supreme Cou rt un ani mity in addressing a se nsitive iss ue , see U nited States v. Nixon, 418 U .S. 683 (1974) (Nixon tapes case). 7 See, e.g., Ruth Bader G insb urg, R emarks on Writing Separately, 65 Was h. L. Rev. 133, 138-45 (1990) (su ggesting that Un ited States judges sh o uld exercise more res tra int before writing separately); Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis a nd Reform 236-43 (1985) (arguing that although it would be "a great error to suppress" separate opinions, in so me cases, separa te op ini o ns can " comm unicate a se ns e of the law's instability th at is mis leadi ng"); Z o Bel! , supr a note 5, at 211-14 (suggesting judges should consider the und esira bl e effects o f dissenting as well as the reasons for disse nt); id. at 203 n.98 (citing other literature on the " problem" of separate opinions).
s See, e.g., Wi lliam J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of D isse nts, 37 Hastings L.J. 427
(1986); Edward McG lynn Gaffney, J r. , T h e Importance o f D isse nt a nd the Imperative of Judicial Civili ty, 28 Va l. U. L. Rev. 583 (1994) ; Kolsky, supra note 2, at 2082-87; see also Kevin M. Stack, Note, The Practice of D issent in the Supre me Co urt, 105 Ya le L.J. 2235 (1996) (arguing that the practice of dissent is justified no t in terms of th e rule of law, but in terms of ideals of deliberative democracy).
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yet none has fully acco unted for this crucial component of the judicial process. ·'unammrty norm. · 'u1ven t ne a sence o,_ pnor co m mentary on the unanimity norm , I begin, in P art I, by showing th e e xtertt to which Dela;,vare 's decisions are in fact overwhelmingly unanim ous. I th en describe the practices that seem to make unan imity possible in Deiaware in an era when so few other rnod ern courts are characterized by a unanimous decisionmaking process. Part II ex plores the effects of unanimity on the de velopment of D elaware corporate law doctrine. My initial ass essment emphasizes what on the surface appears to be a particularly troublesome consequence of the unanimity norm, as compared to a nonunanimity regime. Drawing from the extensive recent li terature on soci al choice, I argue that unanimity magnifies the likelihood of "cycling" and cycling-like effects-that is, of shifts by the supreme court from one doctrinal approach to another. 11 I illustrate this concern with an example based on, and in many respects exemplified by, a series of unanimously decided Delaware takeover cases. rv1y conclusion that unanimity magnifies the risk of cycling raises the question of why, given its effects, the unanimity norm is li kely to have evolved and survived. T he obvious answer, that D elaware's unanimity norm reinforces the credibility of the supreme court, does not seem especially help-9 l am aware of only on e law review article that eve n mentions Delawa re's tendency to speak with a unanimous vo ice. See Jeffrey N. Gordo n. Corpo.-ations, Mark e ts, and Co urts, 91 Colum. L. R e v. 1931 Colum. L. R e v. , 1968 Colum. L. R e v. -69 (1991 ( alluding to th e fact that Delaware's takeover case s have bee n co nsisten tl y unanimou s).
' 0 I us e th e term " norm" somewh a t ad vi sed ly , giv e n the burgeoning litera ture o n norm s in legal scholarship. In describing an as pect of Delaware supreme co urt decisionmaking as a norm, I employ the term more broadly than those w ho treat norm s as necessa ril y nonlegal in nature. For an excellent introduction to the current legal literature on norms, see Symposium , Law, Eco nomics, & Norm s, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1643 Rev. (1996 .
" The problem of cycling also is re ferred to as the "Condorce t Paradox ," a ft er th e French mathem a ticia n and phil osopher Marquis de Co ndorcet, who was on e of th e first scholars to identify and exp lore the paradox. 12 Only by taki n g the sunreme court 's role as moral arbiter of di rectorial b ehavior ~ into account is it possible to fully appreciate the role of unanimity on t he court. lVioreover, attending to the moral d imension of the cases re duces some of the concerns about the pervers e effects of unanimity. I argue in particular that , even when th e court's doctrine is unstable, the outcome in the cases often is more predictable.
As this brief overview suggests, I focus throughout the Article on the role of unanimity in the development of corporate law. As I hope wi ll be obvi ous, however , the analysis also is generalizable in many respects, and offers useful insights on broade r questions as to the costs and benefits of unanimous and non unanimous judicial regirnes .
I. T HE ROAD TO UNANIMITY: HOV/ DELAWARE GETS THE RE
Delaware's norm of unanimity differs markedly from t he de--cisionmaking p ractices of other high courts. Aside from occasional, high -pro file e xceptions and a brief attempt at unity during the Marsh all Court era, the J ustices of the Supre me Cou rt , as noted above, have always issued multiple opini ons in a significant percentage of their cases. (Mar. 5 , 1996) (unpublished manuscript, o n file with the Virginia Law Review Association). 13 My focus in thi s paper is on high court d ec isionmaking, but it is perhaps worth noting th a t intermediate courts o f appeal a lso are characterized by a multiplicity of opinions , th oug h to a lesser e xtent. Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 147. In addition , erally been less di vided than the Supreme Court, perhaps in part Ev en the high of the less obviously he terogenous st a te of I na ,l. '1Dt.:) T~j~t:' a~~,.i~ .,· !ad Y) Prq·"!y t h~T t y-fi ve ·oerce-r\· ; -l'·.f 1 ~rj ~P ~\. im · ' p 14
Tho Da1<;.~--lf~'""' ""'"''·"'-.,-, o '' O"rt could 1-, ard 'y ho ·r~~"""' n; f fw-an·> appe ll a te judges routinely issue separate opinions in the cases the y hear e n bane.
1 " These perce ntages a n: derived fr om a series of WESTLA W searches I conducted on the high courts of several states. For detailed search parameters , see Appendi x A. With respect to Caiifornia, I counted 69 nonunanimous decisions-49 wi th at least one dissent , and 20 with concurrences a lone-o ut of roughl y 106 reported decisions in 1995 . (I defined reported decisions for the purposes of my searches to exclud e ru lin gs on certiorari and pro forma decisions, even if they were included in a re porter) . For Indiana, my se arch reve a le d 58 nonunanimous decisions (42 with disse nts, 16 wirh concurrences alo ne) out of 167 in 1995, or 34.7 %.
1 ; I give a more de tail ed break down in Ap pendix A , which anal yzes the output of the supreme court from 1960 to 1996. A sta tistical analysis of thi s data done by J im L ind gren using logistic regressio n in SPSS 7.5 made cl ear that th e De la ware supreme co urt has mai ntaine d a consistent commitment to uniformity ove r [he entire tim e period 1 conside red . Professo r Lindgre n used the year of the case as the predictor variab le and whet he r there was a separa te opi nion as the respo nse varia ble. The positive tre nd was so tiny (B==.008 1; R== .OOOO) that th e re was no mea ningful trend in the data. If these data had bee n a sample rather than the enti re popu lation , the results would not have been statisticall y significant. My thanks to Pro fessor Lindgre n for the statistical help. 16 Of the 20 or so states 1 looked at, o nly Rhode Island (four in 1995) and New Hamps hi re (fiv e in 1995 ) we re comparably stingy to Delaware in issu ing separate op ini ons. Beca use these sta tes, like De laware, are geograp hically small and have sma ll (five-m e mber ) high co urts, one might initially be tempted to conclude that sma ilness of state and of court are the principal determinants of how freq ue ntly a state high court is likely to issue separate opinions. Yet a quick lo o k at comparab le states immed iately complicates the picture .
T he high courts of geographically small stat es often are not coh es ive. F or instance, the Conn ecticut h igh court was divided 44 times in 1995 , while th e New J ersey high co urt was divided 29 times. Small co urt size can also be misle ading. T he Nort h Dakora and So uth Dako ta high courts, both of which (like Delaware) have five members , had 60 and 54 nonunan imous opin ions respe ctively in 1995 . A nd, as noted T wo fa cets of the Delaware judicial system serve as a starting point for understanding the supreme court's ability to speak with a unifi ed voice. T he first is Delaware's selection p rocess. Many states popularly elect their high court judges. In Delav.; .A nominating commission , one of whose members is appoin1:ed by the Executive Committe e of the Delaware Bar Association, does all of the initial screening, then submits a list of annrc-rri·· ate candidates to the governor.
13 Although the governo; has \ : he fina l say as to who serves on the court, he or she chooses from a short list prepared by the commission. 19 earlier, Indiana's fiv e -just ice high court had 58. See supra note 14. Eve n the combination of a sm all state and a small court is far from foolproof a s an indica tor, as evidence d by the fact that V ermont's five-member supre me cou rt issued 26 nonunanim o us decisions in 1995 . Thus , a lthough I discuss the significan ce of D e laware 's small court further below, see infra text accompan ying not es 22-26, small co urt a nd small state only begin to explain Delaware's unanimity norm. I suggest seve ral addition a l factors, each of which plays a crucial rol e , in th e an a lysi s th at foll ows. 17 In the legislative context, the corporation law section of the D el aware Bar Association does nearly all o f the work in deve loping and drafting proposed amendments to the corporation law . Although th e two ho uses of the D el a ware G e nera l Assembly fo rm a lly enact th e amendments, the Ge neral A ssembly has tended (exce pt o n o ne or two hi gh-profil e occasions) simpl y to ru bberstam p th e propos a ls forwarded by the corporation la w section. For a use ful acco ur.t of D e laware 's legislati ve process, see C urti s Alva, Delaware and th e Mark et for Co rporate Charters: H isto ry and Agency, 15 Del. J. Corp . L. 885, 903-16 (1990) ; see also Dav id A. Drexl e r, The G rowth of C orporate Law, in The De la ware Bar in the Twe nti e th Ce ntury 583, 594 (Helen L. Winslow, Anne E . Bookout & Pat ri cia C. Hannigan eds ., 1994) (h e re in after T he De laware Bar) (noting an unwritten tradition , as o f the 1960s, that D e laware 's G en eral Assembly never consid ere d a proposed corpora te law amendment unl ess the Bar Assoc ia tion had reco mm ended it ).
18 In addition to the Bar A ssociation representative , the commiss ion includes eight members selected by the governor, four of whom must be me mbers of the D elaware supreme court bar and four of whom cannot be me mbers of any b ar. See Del. Exec. Order No.3, Mar. 29, 1993 § 1 (on file with th e Virginia Law Review Association) . T he importance of the loca l ba r's ro le was underscored by a subsequent executive o rder th at makes clear that th e commissi on can disclose confidential information to th e Bar Associ ation 's Com mittee o n Judicia l Appo intments. See Del. Exec. O rd er No. 10, A ug. 20, 1993 § 1 (amending D el. E xec. O rd e r No. 3 § 6) (on fil e with the Virgi ni a Law R ev ie w Association).
19 Th e commission is req uired to submit not less than three nominees un less the entire commission agrees to submit few e r. See Del. Exec. O rd er No .3 , sup ra note 18, § 7. The bar 's influ e nce was particularly striking when Justice An dre 'N Moore's 12-Judicial nominations do alternate between the two p ol itical parties, 20 but as the discussion thus far suggests, the process is large ly divorced from party politics in practice and is in that sense apolitica L M oreover, the local bar-and th r·ough it the nomin ating cornrnission--is acu tely aware of Delaware's tradi--tional orom inence in corvo:rate law , and of the value of ore-.~.
,:,_ !.
• A c a ~e·;;; u:l t T":i r· 1~l ·,·: '?rP'c: c.:upremP c u~l l Y\" 'l . 'l'' i· ic· e '~ a ·"p '"~' ··n r ;·,-p. year 1995) . B ut the co rpor ate law cases have a n obvious prominence due to the importance o f corporation-based income to Delaware 's economy. Corporation cases also differ some wh at from case s on crim in al and tort law iss ues due to Delaware's two-tier jud icial system. Cases on corporate and commercial law arc heard in the chancery court, a court of e quity . Other cases are heard in Delaware's superior court in the first instance.
Sef\llllg tflat
' 2 No sta te has fewer than five members on its highest court; six states hav e nin e membe rs on the ir highest court, twenty-six states have seven , and e ighteen states (including Delaware) have five.
V./ant 's Federa l-State Co urt Directory 125-77 (RobertS. Wanted. , 1994) . Severa l corporate law commentators hav e pointed to th e sma il size of De laware's judiciary, which consists of the five chancery judges who com prise the lower e quity court, toge ther with the five-member sup reme co urt , as an important fa ctor in its decisionmaking process in corporate la w cases. h r •.
• h , . . , 11 d . . · -, . 1 uoou t _at racuons am ong L e J usttces Wl un ermme tw::: ::oun s commitr.nent to speaking with a unanimous voice . Yet s-::lection proce s and sm all size almost certainly can not by the rnselves ensure un animity. One can easily imagine that an inte rest in ju--dicial reputation or simply differing views on important issues could cause one or more justices to write separately with some regularity.
26
T hat a justice must be reappointed after twelve years mitigates the desire to write separately, but the reappointment check is at most a limited one.
27
To more fully explain the court's success in consisten tly issuing un animous decisions , we n eed to consider a third fa ctor: th e :.1 Th e three-justice co urt was in st itute d in 1951. Prior to 1951, D ela wa re ha d no p erman e nt supreme court justices. It employed a "leftover judge" syste m, pursuant to which lower court judges who had no t been involved in a given case const ituted th e "suprem e court " for the purpose s of resolving a n appeal. See Paul D olan , The Supreme Cour t of De laware. 1900-1 952, 56 Dick . L. Rev. 166, 166 (1 95 2) .
:-1 Henry R. Horsey & William Duffy, The Supreme Court A fter i 951: Th e Separate S up re me Court , in T he Delawa re Bar, supra note 17 , a t 384, 384-85 (notin g that as case filings tripled between the 1960s and 1970s, Chief Justice Herm a nn called for an e xpanded court, which was e ve ntually provided by th e leg islature in November, 1978) . (7). I di scuss the particular requirements in fra note 31 a nd accompa nyin g text.
: 6 Notice the contrast 'Nith a nonunanimity regim e . Under un animity, justices have an ongoing incentive to write separately , and to free ride on th e other justices' co llective committme nt to un a nimity. No nunanimity regimes a rc Iik e iy to be more stable because they do not present similar opportunities for free riding.
: 7 See, e. g. , Del. E xec. O rd e r No. 3, supra note 18, at § 11 ("S itting judges who are 'Willing to be rea p pointed sha ll not be de nied recommendation by the Co mmission e xcept upon the affirmativ e vo te of at least two-third s of the membe rs. " ).
A noth er factor that se ems likely to enhance con sensus, at least o n th e margin, is that the Delaware supreme court does no t have certiorari powers, a nd thus d oes no t select cases with an eye to developing th e case law.
court's internal operating procedures.
28 U nder the courf s internal procedures, the justices ordinarily do not discuss cases u:n til after oral argument. 29 Further, cases are assigned with an eye to discouraging the devel opment of specialties.
30
Both practices te nd to encourage the kind of consensus that is reflected in the court's ovinions .
._he most re mancao e i.e ature or tne court .; mterna1 procedures , hmvever , is that they impose a si gnific21.nt cost on dissenting from a panel opinion . Both the Supreme Court R ules and the Internal Operating Procedures provid e for an automatic en bane hearing in the eve nt of any pan el disagree ment.' 1 Thus, a justice can write separately only if he or she is 'willing to force a fu ll court he aring and continues to adhere to his or her original position . In consequ ence, a dissent is likely to emerge only under extraordinary circumstances.
In short, almost every aspect of the evolution of D elaware supreme court decisionmaking-from the selection of justices, to the court's small size, to its rules and intern al operating proce-' 3 T he princip a l sources of the court's practices are the Delaware S uprem e C ourt Rules an d its Internal O perating Procedures. Until 1994, the Internal Operating Proced ures were simpl y informa l norms o f practice that th e court e mployed. The proced ures were codified in 1994, after two ne w justi ces join e d the court. Telephone Intervi e w with C hief Justice E. Norman Veasey (J une 1996) [here in a fter Veas ey Int erv ie w]. ' 9 De l. Sup. C t. Intern a l O p. P. IX( l ) . It is inte re st ing to note th a t jurors in bo th civi l an d cr imin a l trials opera te under simil ar stri ct ures aga inst disc uss in g a case outsid e of th e fo rmal decisionmak ing process . As with the sup re me co urt, it see ms likely th at one effec t of the practice is to e nco urage co nsen sus. ' 0 De l. Sup. C t. Intern a l Op. P. V I(2). G iven th at the ch ief j ustice has ultimate respon sibility for ov ersee ing the panel assignment process, see id. V 1(1 ), the effect of the policy again st speciali zation obv iously de pends on how the chief justice wi e lds his o r her a uth ority.
" De l. Sup. C t. R. 4(d); Del. Sup. Ct. In te rn a l Op . P . V II (cases un able to garner a unanimous opini o n mov e automatically to en bane co nsiderat ion) . T he rationale for requiring that divided op inions b e heard e n bane is that a split opinion does not retl ect the vo tes of a majority of the fiv e -me mber co urt. Veasey Int e rvi ew, s upra note 28 . Ot her cases th a t presen t grounds for an e n bane hea ring incl ude cases that will poss ibly overturn a Delaware precedent, capital cases, a nd cases that two justices vote to hear en bane. Del. Sup. Ct. Intern a l Op . P. VII.
Interestingly, the supreme court does no t tell th e pa rties o r ot herw ise ma ke clear the reaso n why it is reh ea ring a case en bane. Veasey Interview, supra note 28. This suggests that if the full court la te r issu es a unanimous op inion , a s it often does, o bse rve rs ma y no t know whe th er it was th e prospect of disagreeme nt o r of ove rruling prior prece dent tha t precipitated th e full co urt 's revi ew . du res-reinforces the court's tendency to speak with a single vmce.
II. TJ:t-.JANIMITY AND D OCTRINAL C YCLING
Identifying the te ndency toward unanimity, an d the fact ors reinforcing it, raise s a cruci al qu estion: \Vhat d ifference d oes unanimity m ake, as comp ared to an alternative regime ? lhe o bvious ans-... ve r is that unanimity may stabilize the case law, since it eliminates the possibility that fra gment ation vvill cast doubt on the court's reasoning in a given are a.
Yet unanimity can have almost precise ly the opposite effect. T he suggestion that unanimity may undermin e the cl ari ty of a court's decisions is not new, 32 but previous commentators h ave tended simpiy to note this without exploring it in an y sys tem atic way. My goal in the analysis that follows is to use the insights of social choice theory to provide a much more detailed assessment of the effects of unanimity.
33
Because I am primarily concerned with unanimity in D elaware corporate law cases, I focus on D elaware's takeove r cases 34 and use an illustration based loosely on these cases to demonstrate (among other things) how unanimity may magnify the risk o f doctrinal cycling. In addition to showing the effects of un ani mity, my analysis helps to explain an enduring irony of Delaware corporate law: the fact that , while stability is oft en recited as one of the re as ons for D elaware's success in attracting corporations, D elaware 's doctrine in several crucial are as appears, at 32 See, e .g. , Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the C ourt, 95 Harv. L. Re v. 802 , 810 & n.23 (1982) (suggestin g that th e contine ntal trad iti o n of unanimity is characte ri ze d by sho rt, platitude-filled opinions that prov ide littl e guid a nce). 33 For useful analyses of other corporate law issues in soci a l choice terms, see William J . Carn e y, Does Defining Co nstitu e ncies Matt e r? , 59 Ci n. L. R e v. 385 , 420-22 (1990) (detailing perve rse effe cts of " other constitu e ncy "' statutes ); J e ffrey N. G ordon, Shareh o ld er Initi a tive: A Soci a l Ch o ice and G ame Th e oretic A pproach to C orporate Law, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 347 (1991) (suggesting that cycling concerns may justify abso lute de le gation rule that preve nts share holders fro m initia ting mos t corporate decisions) ; se e a lso David A. Skee l, Jr. , Some Corpo rate a nd Securities Law Perspectives on Student-Athl e tes and the NCAA, 1995 Wi s. L. R e v. 669, 679-82 (re viewing social choice e ffects of stud e nt-athl e te represe ntation in N CAA decisionmaking).
).1
Ev e ry one of th e hostil e takeover cases I discuss was unanim o us. least on initial inspection, to be remarkably unstab1e.
35

A . Social Choice and Delaware Takeover Law
In order to set the stage for the social choice analysis that fo Eov;s, I begin by briefly describing the doctrinal devdoprn ents
t hat vnlr serve as tne bas1s tor our exp10rat10n m: tn e u.
•:J anEl.·nty no rm. In the mid-1980s, the dramatic increase in tak eovers gave rise to a series of cases that posed a particularly cE:f:ficult d ilemma for Delaware judges. In the face of a hosti le bi d , or 2 contest between fr iendly and hostile bidd ers, the d in:.cto:cs of a target corporation often too k measures to prevent the hostile bi dder from acquiring control. For instance , target company managers adopted or refused to remove " poison pill" devices 36 that were designed to make acquisition prohibitively expensive , or added supermaj ority vo ting requirements. Bidd ers re--spond ed by alleging that these efforts violated target directors' fiduciary duty to their shareholders.
The dilemma for the Delaware supreme court was that target directors ' actions in the takeover context did not fi t neatly within either of the traditional categories used in addressing fiduciary duty issues. 37 Target managers have an obvious conflict ' 5 Professors Macey and M ill e r ha ve suggested a n inte rest gro u p e xplanation fo r t he occasi o na l e le me nts of un ce rtaint y in Delawa re law. Jonathan R . Macey & Geoffrey P. lVliller, Towa rd an Interes t-Gro up Th eory o f D elaware C orporate Law, 65 Tex. L Rev. 469, 498-509 (1 987) (suggesting th at Delawar e law is u ncertain e no ugh to a ll ow interest groups s uch as th e corporate bar to o btain re nts, b u t not so uncerta in as to give co rpora ti o ns an incentive to incorporate elsewh e re) . Bu t they do no t address the significance of the supreme court's tendency toward unan im ity. For a mo re d e tail ed co nsid e ration of interest group issues , see infra Part Iif.
· '
6 Poi son pills take a vari e ty of forms, mos t of which in vo lve a promise by the target corporat io n to give stock or other securiti es to th e firm 's sha re hold ers, or se ll the m at a barga in price, in the eve nt of an acquisition of a specifi e d p o rtion of th e target's stock. See Randall S. T homas, Judici a l Review o f Defensive Tactics in Pro xy Co ntests: W he n is Using a Rights Plan Right?, 46 Vand. L Rev. 503 , 510-11 (1993) .
37 Oversimp li fy ing somewhat, directorial duties fa ll in to two gen eral ca tegories: the duty of ca re a nd the duty of loya lty. The duty o f care is , as t he name suggests, a n o bliga tion that directors e xercise appropriat e care in ma kin g d ecisions fo r the firm. The b usiness judgment rule acts as a presumption in most cas e s that a dire ctor has in fac t satisfi ed thi s o bliga ti o n. See, e. of interest in the takeover context, because they frequently will be replaced in the event of a takeover. Thus, the tradition al deference that the d u ty of care and business judgment ru le provide for d irectors vv'ho do n o t have a conflict of interest did not seem in o rder. Yet the cases also were n o t classic du ty o f loyalty cases. , vih ich are subj ect to aggressive revie\v, because the d irectors' conflict of interest , though very :rec:d; ~;v as rnuch less direct than iD a traditional duty of loyalty case .
Dela\var;':'s response was to attempt to articula te an intermediate stan dard of review in the ta keover cases . The sunreme l court has suggested in a series of decisions spanning the last decade that it will apply scrutiny that is greater than in most contexts , but not so searching as in true duty of loyalty cases.
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For the purposes of our analysis of unanimity, assume th at D elaware has three justices/ 9 that the takeover cases have just arisen , and the justices' positions on the issue are as fo llows. Hypoth e tical Justice Alde n believes that tar get managers fa ce a severe conflict of interest and should therefore be su bject to significantly enhanced scrutiny. That is, these cases are much more Dei. 1986) . the court held th at th e direct ors' use of d e fens ive measures must be a reasonably proportiona te response to a reasonab le be li e f th at a hosti le bid constitu tes a threat, Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 , and that if it beco mes clear that th e target is '·in play,'' the directors must foc us so le ly on obtain in g the best pr ice for shareho lders. Rev/on, 506 A .2d a t 184 n.16. These cases ca ll for an interme diate leve l of scr utiny, and thu s correspond roughly to the "E nh anced Scrutiny " standard I describe below .
Th e co urt has subseque ntl y engaged in several striking s hifts. Most prom in ently , the court ap peared to e mph asize director di scretio n in Paramount Commun ica tions v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (De l. 1989 [herein afte r Time-Wamer for short form case citati ons], only to shift o nce again to a n approach loose ly anaiogous to the position I describe below as "Share holder Prerogative," in Para mount Comm unicati ons v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34 (De l. 1993) . I discuss the se s hifts, and the possibi li ty that they may amount to cycling, further infra note 75. The o th e r important cases in this doctrinal lin e are U nitrin, Inc. v. A me ri ca n Gen. Corp., 65 1 A.2d 1361 (De l. 1995), Mi ll s Acqu isition Co . v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (De l. 1988 ), a nd Ivan hoe Part ners v. Ne wm on t Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987 .
'" As noted earlie r , see supra tex t acco mp an ying no te s 23-25, De lawa re's supreme court hears cases in three-justice panels, but the e ntire court hears th e case in so me circumstances . I ass um e three justices in order to simp li fy t he exposition , b ut t he a nalys is that fo llows will hold tru e any time the j ust ices hol d three or more positions, no one pos ition is held by a majority, and any coalition comp rising the justices holding two of the three pos iti o ns wo uld garner a majority.
like duty of loyalty than duty of care cases and the court should therefore conduct a substantive review of every transaction the directors either approved or stymied. I will refer to this approach as "Enhanced Scrutiny."
H ypothetical Justice Baker, by contrast, thin ks a better approach is to focus on the shareholders of the target. In order to ensure that shareholders rather than directors ultimately retain control over the decision whether to accept a takeover bid, given the directors' conflict of interest in this context, Baker would forbid the directors from using defensive measures against a hostile bid except in two circumstances: (1) to facilitate an active auction;~0 or (2) if the shareholders would retain effective control of the corporation even after the directors thwarted a hostile bid and facilitated a merger with another, favored bidder.41 Otherwise, the directors would not be permitted to interfere wi th any tender offer or otherwise wrest control of the takeover decision from the shareholders.
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I will refer to this view as "Shareholder Prerogative."
Finally, hypothetical Justice Clark believes that target directors should be given substantial discretion, both because D elaware has long emphasized directors' authority to manage the corporation, 43 and because th e directors do not face a true confli ct of interest in the takeover context. This position I will call "Director D iscretion. " " 0 The rationale for permitting the directors to exercise control for the limited purpose of conducting an a uction is that an auction will generally increase the takeover premium that shareholders receive, and shareholders are not wellposition ed to conduct the auction themselves. " 1 Baker 's second exception assumes there is less cause for concern if the shareholders retain ultimate control, and thus can reverse any transaction of which they disapprove. See, e.g., QVC, 637 A.2d at 45 (emphasizing the fact that the target shareholders would not retain control after the proposed transaction).
·~ Baker's view is thus a variation of Easterbrook and Fischel 's " passivity thesis," which contends that directors should be prohibited from defending against a hostile bid in any way. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fi sche l, The Proper Rol e of a Target's Management in Res po nding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv . L. Rev. 1161 Rev. (1981 . Unlike the passivity thesis, Baker's position would allow the directors to use defensive measures, but only in the narrow circumstances describ ed in the text.
"' See, e.g., Pogostin v. Rice , 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984 ) ("The bedrock of the Ge neral Corporation Law of Delaware is the rule that the business and a ffa irs of a corporation are manage d by a nd under the direction of its board.").
Continuing the example, assume further that if the court did not select E nhanced Scrutiny, Alden would prefer that the justices choose Shareholder Prerogative rather than Director Discretion , due to her strong opinion that managers cannot be truste d with the takeover decision. Baker's second choice, after Shareholder Prerogative, v.;ould be Director Discretion, because she beli eves that courts are not well situa ted to engage in a sub·· . .
h . stant1ve rev1e\v or corporate ec1s1onmaKmg. .<' l. "L ougn s. e 1s sk eptical of managers' motives, she would rather have thern making the decisi on than a court, if the Shareholder Prerogative approach is to be rejected. As for Clark, based on her view that directors rathe r than shareholders should be the principal deci·· sionmakers, she woul d opt for Enhanced Scrutiny as her second choice after Director Discretion.
The justices' rankings of the three approaches would therefore look like this:"" The problem here is th at the justices' preferences" 5 are unstable. If the justices were to hold a series of pairwise votes among "" As the description in the text suggests, my analysis focuses on the justices' varying doctrinal approaches-that is, their views on alternative legal "rules." Professor Kornhauser has argued that courts should and do focus solely on the "results" of previous cases for stare decisis purposes, rather than on the legal rule that is applied in a given context. Econ. & Org. 441, 443-44 (1992) . Because this contention seems notably inaccurate as a description of Delaware supreme court decisionmaking, given the important (though somewhat misleading, as we will see in Part IV) role that doctrinal rules play in the Delaware cases, I put it to one side. For a similar criticism of Kornhauser's characterization of the nature of stare decisis, see Bruce Chapman, The Rational and the Reasonable: Social Choice Theory and Adjudication, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 41, 47 n.ll (1994) . " 5 In using the term "preference" here and elsewhere in the analysis, I do not mean to suggest that the justices base their decisions on their personal perspectives, rather It is this dilemma--the inability to m ake a stable choice among three or more options-that social choice theorists refer to as ('cycling;' or the " Condorcet P aradox. ".j
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Kenneth Arrow generalized the insight with his famous theorem demons trating that it is impossible to guarantee that a collective decisio nmaking process will both satisfy a short list of fairness req uirements,4~ and maintain rationality, which Arrow defined as the than at te m pti ng to make objective judgments. See Lewis A . Ko rnhauser & Lawrence G . Sager, U npac king the Court, 96 Yale L.J. 82 (1986) (d istin guis hing jud gm en t a nd prefe re nce -based a djudicati o n, and arguing th a t adjudication tends to be judg m e ntbased). Rather, in keeping with co nv e ntion in the socia l choice literature, I use the te rm sole ly to distinguish th e justice s' differing views on th e fi d uc ia ry duty issue. Se e , e .g., Gordon, supra no te 33, at 362 n.35 (noting a nd ad opting thi s usage) . 175 (1981) . It is im porta nt to e mp hasize that a cycling problem only aris es if th e justices' vi e ws include at least three pe rspectives th a t ca nn ot be a rrange d on a single -peaked curve-that is, if the justices ' views are mult ipea ked . For useful discussio ns o f the se re q uiremen ts, see D ennis C. Mueller, P ublic C hoice II, at 81, 393 (1989) ; William H . R iker, Li b e rali sm A ga in st Populism: A Co nfrontatio n Between the Theory of D emocracy and the Theo ry of Social Choice 123-28 (Waveland Press 1988 ) (1982 . !f the j ustices had differing views of just two approaches, or if th ey had similar views a bout the decisionmaking framewo rk , their preferences would not cycl e. O n the other han d, unanimity can cause somewhat relate d problems ev en in the a bs ence of cycling. I d iscuss this, and the que stion whether supreme court justices are lik ely to h ave multipeaked preferences, infra Section II.B .
.1iJ Kenneth J. A rrow, Socia l Choice and Individu al Va lu es ( i 95 1). T he most impo rt ant of the "fairne ss " re quirements for the a nalysis that follows are ''range" a nd ability to aggregate the preference rankings of three or more 'Pf~:-tererlce s~ ou.tc,Jrne ~vot1 r1g tertcis to ct1 sgL1.1Se tr1e ex1st e11ce f) l a cyc: \e by forcin g the justices to re ach a decision on the case as a 1 1Vf' . _niP_.,
have no choice but to decide whether or not the target di rectors
h ave V101ate tne1r naue1ary ~._: uty:
"independence of irre leva nt alternatives. " The range postulate requires th a t no possible individual preference orde ring be off-limits. Independence requires that each decisio nmaker adhere to her actual ordinal ranking of th e alternatives, rathe r than, for instance, altering her cho ice with an eye to a subsequent vote for st rategic reasons. The remaining requirements include unive rsality , whic h re quires that no collecti ve prefe rence ordering be precluded; unanimity, or the Pareto postulate, which requires that the process honor any preference that eve ry individua l would agree to; and nondictatorship, which proh ibits any individual 's preferences from trumping those of other individuals. . The effect of case-by-case decisionmak in g is to limit appe llate courts to one of two principal choices in most cases-to affirm or rev erse. Because there are onl y two options, cycling cannot occur within the case at hand, al though the effect may be to mas k cyclical preferences across the underlying issu es .
One of the costs of the case-by-case approach is that it may allow, and eve n cause, inconsiste nt treatm e nt of the issu es that underli e the result In view of this , se veral comme ntators have argued that courts should abandon case-by-case voting, at !east in some cases . See, e.g., Lewis A. Korn hauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The O ne an d the lv!any: Adjudication in Collegial Cour ts, 81 Cai. L. Rev_ 1, 30-33, 57 (1993) Second, stare decisis reduces the likelih ood of cycling through tirne. Because it establishes at least a presumption against reconsiderin g a rule or outcome that was rejected in a previous case , stare decisis reduces the li keli hood of intertemporal cycling.'i This second context, the possi bility of intertempor al cyclLg, is ' v' ihere th e unanimity norm may actuall y have a destabili z ing rather than a stabilizing effect on doctrinal develo pmen t as compared to a less unified approach. In order to appreciate th is , consider how our hypothetical justices might address a specific dispute unde r the unanimity norm, as compared to a regime -where th ey more fre quently issued separate opinions .
Ass ume that T arget has recently signe d a pre limin ary merger agreeme nt with Friendly Corp. pursuan t to which Target shareh olders will receive stock of F rie ndly currently worth $50/share in return for their sh ares of Target. No single shareholder holds more than 1% of Target's stock, but Manager , the chief executive officer of Friendly, holds 70% of Friendly's stock and wou ld hold 40 % of the combined company. Shortl y afte r th e prelimi-[h e rei n afte r T he O n e a nd T h e M any] (a d voca ting " metavo te" as to wh e th e r to e mpl oy case -b y-case or issu e-by-issue vo ting). H owe ve r, no t o nl y wo ul d su ch app ro aches e nt a il a signi fica nt ch a nge fro m curre nt pract ice , b u t th ey al so wo uld introd uce probl e ms tha t co ul d p rove m o re tro ubl esome tha n th e o nes th ey a dd re ss . Se e , e .g., Ma xwe ll L. S tea rn s, H ow O utco m e Vo tin g Pro mo tes Prin cipled Issue Id e ntifi cati on : A R ep ly to Professo r Jo hn R ogers a nd Ot he rs, 49 V a nd. L. Rev . 1045
(1 996 ).
; 1 F or ins ta nce, in th e exampl e we ha ve b e e n co ns ide rin g, if a p ri o r case h ad e stabl ishe d E nh a nced Scru tin y as the pro p e r a p pro ach o ve r Share ho ld e r P re roga ti ve , sta re decisis wou ld li mit t he justi ces' ability to re vis it S ha rehol d e r P reroga ti ve in a subseque nt case . In Arrovi a n terms, sta re d ec isi s lim its th e " ra nge " of a va il a bl e d ecisions (becau se it e liminates a n o ption ) , and in doing so preve nts the justice s fr o m e ngagin g in e no ugh p airwi se vo te s to re vea l a cycl e . It th us se rves m uc h t he sa m e fu nctio n as a p rohi b iti o n aga in st recon siderin g rejected mo ti o ns in th e leg is la ti ve co n text. See Stea rn s, Standing B ack, s upra no te 50, at 1356-5 7; S te a rn s, Hi s to ri ca l E vide nce , sup ra no te 50, at 3 19 & n.38.
T h e cos t of th e sta b ilit y pro vid e d b y sta re d eci sis is t ha t it crea tes p ath d e p e nd e n ce a n d th e possib ility of pa th ma nipul atio n. In th e exa m p le just give n, fo r in stance , if a subse q ue nt case p itt ed E nh a nced Scrutin y aga ins t D irecto r D iscre ti o n , D ire ctor D iscret ion (whi c h Ba ker a nd C la rk p re fe r to E nh a nce d Scru tin y) wo uld e m e rge as th e rul e, e ve n thoug h o th e r sequ e nces o f ca ses wo ul d le ad to E nh a n ce d Scrutiny o r Sha re ho lde r Pre rogat ive . Yet sta nding a nd re la te d justiciab ili ty requirements reduce t he threa t of pat h ma ni p ul a ti on . Se e, e.g ., Ste a rns, H istorica l Ev idence , supra not e 50, a t 335-37. B ut see E aste rb roo k, supra no te 32 , a t 820 (arguin g th at sta re d e ci sis sho u ld be reiaxe d or a bando ned in constitu tio nal law case s in o rd e r to red uce pa th d e p e nd e nce ). • l . . . f" . . . . , ~_o n to t wart, t11e te~?er one:r v1 o ated ti1eu · l·j.uc,ory c uty to Under these ci rcumstances, A lden -vvould atgue t~::: t ·~l arget' s directors sh ould be subject to E n hanced Scru tiny, and woul d almost certainly conclude that the dire ctors breache d the ir duti e s by refus ing even to consider the higher bid. Und~r Baker's preferred approach , Shareholder Prerogative, the case is somewh at closer, sin ce Target 's shareh olders the oretically could o ust th e directors of the com bined company after the rnerger or entertain a future takeover bid . B ecause M anager vvill hold 40% of the stock, however , shareholders' voting power would be m o re theoretical than real after a merger, so Baker too might conclude th at Target's directors should h ave co ns idered Hos tile Bidder's offer.
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In contrast to A lden and Baker, Clar k would apply a Director Discretion approach, and might well be inclined to uphold the directors' actions absent extraordinary fa ctors calling their judgment into qu estion.
Al though the justices would h old that the Target d irectors breached their fiduciar y duties un der both no nu mmi:mity and unanimity regimes, the opinions reflecting this conclusion would 52 T he illu stratio n is th us somet hing of a hybrid between Pa ramo unt Com municat ions v. T im e, Inc., 571 A . .2d 1245 , 1247 , 125 1 (Del. Ch. 1993 . 53 In most of t he takeover cases, bo th the hostil e bidd er and a group of non bi dde r shar eholders have fi led su its see king to e njoin the targe t directors . l n vi e vv of this, wh at we might expect to see is a single opinion th at a ttempts to bring all three positions to bear. T hus , A lden might draft an opinion emphasizing the need for Enh a nced Scrutiny in the takeover context, yet also suggesting that Sharehol d er Prerogative is a crucial factor and t hat the analysis is wholly consistent with Deiaware 's traditional commitment to Director Discretion.
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As a quick look at almost any of Delawa re 's recent takeover decisions shows, this is precisely the form many of the supreme ;s Baker's decision >vhether to join th e Alden op ini o n pres umably wou!d depend o n A lde n's willingn ess to recogni ze Share ho lder Prerogative as a consid e rat ion in th e a na ly sis. Thus, Bak e r might adopt En ha nced Scrut iny as the co ur t's a p proac h, but sugge st th a t courts should consider the effect o n sha reho lders as a factor bear in g on the fairne ss iss ue .
Notice that Enhanced Scrutiny wou!d become the prevailing rule if Baker joined A.ld e n 's opinion. If Baker only concurred in the judgme nt, on th e other h a nd , th e case wo uld not establish a clear approach , since none of th e options would garner tw o votes. See ge nerall y Kornhau se r & Sager, The One and the Many, s upra note 50 , at 8 n.14 (distinguishing betwe en "true " concurrences that reject the majority 's ration a le but concur in the judgment and "two ce nts" concurrence s that jo in th e maj ority but add the justice's own thou g hts on th e case). M o re over, even if Baker join ed th e opinion , her Share holder Pre rogative view could influence subsequent case law to the extent it was seen as a useful way of und e rsta nd ing the maj o rity o pinion. See Ken Kimura, No te , A Le gitimacy Mode l fo r the Interpre ta tion of Plural ity Decisio ns, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1593 (1992) (suggesting precedential auth o rity of pl ura li ty opinions should vary with type ); Igor Kirman , Note, Standing Apart to be a Part: The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Co ncurring Opinions , 95 Co lum. L. Rev. 2083 Rev. (1995 (suggesting a two-p a rt inquiry for determining when a concurre nce shou ld be deem ed to have precedential value).
56 See ge nerally Kirman, s upra note 55 , at 2099 (Suprem e Co urt justice s will add to , o r " deliberately cloud," their analysis to o bta in nece ss ary votes).
court's decisions take . 57 In a very real sense , the decisions suggest not a choice among approaches, bu t of all of th em. In striking contrast to a non u nanimou s regi m.e, the u n an imity no rm encou rages the justices to ado p t a combi n ed a pp roach that is acceptable to all three , rather than articulating their differing views o n the appropriate doct ri nal s pproach. it would preven t the co urt's takeover doctrine from cycling over a series of cases in a nonunanimity regime. The single opinion issued in a unanimity regime, on the other h and, would do nothing to prevent doctrinal cycling. Because the combined initial decision would not rule o ut any of the three a pproaches, the 57 ln QVC, for inst a nce, the court states that " [i]n the sale of comrol contex t, the dire c tors must foc us on one primary objective-to secu re th e transaction offe ring the b t~S t va lu e re asonab ly av ailabl e fo r the stock holders, " QVC, 637 A.2d <1 t 44, an .En h arJCed Scru ti ny sta ndard. T he court then artic ul a tes the directors' obligations in a fash ion that emph asize s directo r discretion: "[A ] court should not ignore th e complexity of th e directors' task .... Th e board of d irectors is the corporate deci sionmaking bod y best equippe d to make these judgrnents." ld . at 45. It also s uggests tha t th e shareholders' loss of voting powe r is a key factor by emp hasizing "the threate ned di minution of th e current stockholders' vo ting power " and "the traditional concern of Delaware courts for actions which impair or impede stock holde r votin g rights ." Id.
" Unani mity could also be see n as encouraging the ju stices to "cardinalize" th e ir p re fere nces-that is, to take inte nsity of prefere nce into acco unt-a nd , for justices vv ho di sagree, to accede to th e wis hes of the othe r justices unl ess they feel par ticul ar ly strongly ab out th e ir views. T hi s p erspective is consistent with several justices' su gges ti o n to me that the Delawa re process is des igned to prod uce unani m ity unless a justice fee ls especiall y strongly abo ut his or her di sagre em e nt . For further discuss io n, see infra note 80.
Failure to take in te nsity of prefe re nce into accoun t is a freq uent cri ti cis m of Arrow 's theorem a nd the subsequent social cho ice li terature . See , e.g., R ichard H . .,ViJ' P"l·n i e T , . . . . . ,., Re1 ;-> Korn hauser co nte nd s tha t diffe ri ng views as to doctrinal rule can not le ad to a cycle in th e absence o f stare decisis. Kornh a user, Collegial Co urts I, su pra note 44, a t 178 (criticizing E aste rb roo k , supra note 32). T hi s a rgument see m s to ignore th e possi bilit y th at nondoctrina l factors-here , th e just ices' vi e ws on the a p propriate outcome in each given case, as seen through the lens of thei r pre fe rre d doctrinal approach-ca n have an e ffect on doctrina l development. As suggeste d by the hypo th etical in the text, the se factors cl e arly can produce a tru e m ajority cycle.
'" M ost obvio usly, sta re decisis acts only as a presum ption of adh e rence to an esta blished app roac h, and it will on ly cou nteract cycl in g to the ex ten t it is in fact applied . Moreover, if Baker concurred onl y in the judgmen t, the stare d ecisis effect of A ld e n's opi ni o n would be limi te d, because the op ini ons would pr ese rve one vot e for eac h of the three positions. Cycli ng-like effects d ue to shifts in th e j ustices' views over time, d isc ussed infra at no tes 67-69 a nd acco mpany in g te xt, are d istinct from th ose due to concurre nces . Fo r a debate abou t th e me ri ts of stare dec isi s, compare Lew is A Kornh a user, A n Econom ic Perspective on Stare Decisis, 65 Chi.-Ke nt L.
Rev. 63 (1 989) (a rguing that stare decisis is d ifficult to justify from an e conomi c perspecti ve ) with Jon ath an R. Macey, T he Internal an d E xte rnal C osts and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 C hi .-Ken t L. R ev. 93 (1989) (arguing th at stare de ci sis b e nefits both li tigants and judges " by al tering the na ture of liti ga nts' de man ds fo r judicial services" ).
61 Commentators ha ve m ade similar points in assess in g U .S. S upreme C o urt decis ionmaking. See, e.g., Easterbrook , su pra Do te 32, at 810, 817 (multipl e opinions prov id e additi onal inform a tion) ; Ri chard L. Revesz & Pame la S . Karlan, No nm ajority Rules a nd the S upreme Court, 136 U. Pa . L. Rev. 1067 Rev. , 1105 Rev. -06 (1988 (n otin g that repeated 5-4 sp li ts in the Supre me Court in d icate an ex isting prece dent ma y be un sta bl e); Ko lsk y, s upra no te 2, at 2085 -86 ("Know ing th e nu mber o f Ju stices who di ss ent from an op ini o n and how they disagre e wili inform peo ple 's views ab out th e le giti macy and force of th e opin ion. " ). 62 Not ice that this is a prob lem in unanimit y regi mes wheneve r th e justices hold di verging views, ev en if the ir prefe rences do not actu a lly cycl e .
The Supreme Court's decisionmaking under the secunt1es laws-the one corporate law context wh ere it, rather than the Delaware supreme court, is the leading source of ju dicial review-offers a striking illustration of the information al diffe rence between unanim ity and nonunan i:mity regimes. \Nhereas shifts in the Delaware supreme court ha ve often come as a surprise , d ue at least in part to the effects of the u, ~an i m i ty no rm , 6 ' the tend ency of U.S . Supreme Court Justices to write separately provides a much more pronounced warning that the existing doctrine is unstable . In the insider trading context, for ex am ple, the Justices' internecine dispu tes have m ade clear to even casu ai observers that the current ap proach-wn ich predicates liability on the existence of a duty of the defendant to a corporation whose stock the defendan t purchases or sells based on inside information-could be displaced by the broader misappropriation theory . 64 The justices do not eliminate the instability by signal-' ' In add ition to the takeover cases we ha ve been consid eri ng, ano ther muchd isc ussed ex ample o f such doctrinal shiftin g ca me in the context of s ubsidiary or '· freezeo ut " mergers, pursuant to which a pa re nt co rporation merges a subs id iary int o itse lf and e limin a tes minority sharehol ders. In Singer v. M agn avox Co., 380 A .2d 969 (De l. 1977) , the supre me co urt shifte d from its tradi tiona l scr u tin y to a m uch stricter approach, req uirin g that th e parent show th e re was a "b usiness purpose" for effectin g the free zeo ut. The co urt a lmost immediately re treated fro m this standard in Ta nzer v. International Ge n. Indus. , 37 9 A. 2d 1121 (D e l. 1977). It has subsequently abandoned it s e mphasis o n busin ess purpose, and has focused on ;vhe th er a n effec ti ve in depe nde nt specia l co mmi ttee negotiated on beha lf of the subs idiary. See -5 (1996) ), as requiri ng th e governm e nt to prove the defend ant was under a duty to a corporatio n whose stock the defend an t boug h t or sold. C h ief Justice B urger arg ued in disse nt that th e gove rnm ent need o nl y show that the defend a nt mi sappropriated information, that is, purloined it from someone. Chiarella, 445 U.S . a t 240 (Burger, C.J., disse nting). Ju stice Blackmun arg ued for a sti ll broad er view, under which any trade r who had in sid e info rmatio n cou ld be held lia ble, regardl ess of whet he r she acquired the inform a ti o n in a n ina ppropr iate fash ion. ld. at 245 -46 (B lackmun, J. , dissenting). Justice Powell's major ity opm10n left the misappropriation theory ope n beca use it had not been rais ed below. Id. at 236 . The Co urt la ter di vid ed 4-4 in a case th a t squ are ly presented the misappropriatio n issue. See Carpe nte r v. U nited States, 484 U. S. 19 (1987) .
T he pate nt in stability in th e S upre me Court's insi der tradi ng jurisprudence has not ling its existence through separate opinio ns, although they do d . h " dh ' . . 65 -:._ T l re uce rt to t 1 e extent t hey a• ·ere to stare aec1s1s. l~onet 1e-less, the opinions forewar n future p r . : uties, and enab le them to adjust their b ehavior accordingly.
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T hus fa r, I have assumed th at the justices ' preferen ces r emain stable through time . 1Che unanim.ity n orm can prod.uce add itional instability if the justices' preferences chan g~~ o ve r ti me . Suppose, for instance, tha t three o f Dela"Y.Jare)s justices initially vievved Enhanced Scrutiny as the best appro8.ch , one preferred . 67 A l o ,areno. er l rerogat1ve, anc. one 1 1rector l)J,scretwn . -though .t:nhanced Scrutiny commands a clear m ajority, the court's opinion might also incor porate Shareh older Prerogative and D irecto r Discretion into the an alysis in order to maintain unanimity. Because th e o pinion preserves all three perspectives, eve n a change of heart by one of the Enhanced Scrutiny justices when the next case com es alo ng, or a change in the composition of the court in the i~t e rim, could introduce the possibility of a su bsequent cycle-like shift among the approaches . (1 987 ). T he Fourth and Eighth Circuits rejc r:t misapp ro pria ti on . U nite d States v. Bryan , 58 F. 3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995); U nited States v. Cn-Iaga n, 92 F.3d 61 2 (8th C ir. 1996), ccrt. granted, 11 7 S. C t. 759 (1997) .
Th e S uprem e Court has rece ntly granted certio rari in O'Hagan , and thus p ro mises to address the misappropriati on t heory directly this te rm.
o; This is refl ected in the C ou rt's continued failure, aft er nearly two deca des , to adopt a se ttled a pproach to Rule lOb-5.
"" See, e.g., R evesz & Karlan , supra no te 61, at 1106 (suggest ing that ev id e nce of doctrinal instab ility diminishes a party 's incentive to rely o n the existing approac h a nd e ncourages litigants to challenge the approach) . 7 Recall th at th e supreme court ordin ar ily hears cases in thr ee ju stice pan e ls. A s discussed eariier, if o ne justice indicated a n inte nti o n to disse nt a t the pan e l level, the prospect of a dissent would automatically trigger an e n bane hearing. See infra notes 23-25, 31 a nd accompanying text.
"' In social cho ice term s, the justices n eed no t engage in " principl e d voting''-that is, because they are not o n r ecord (in an o pinion ) as sup porting a particular approach, they a re much less cons train e d by th e ir origin a l ordinal ranking than would o therwise be the ce>.se. O n the role of opinions in pro moting principled voting, see S tearn s, Standing Back, supra note 50, at 1349-50.
Notice that, with cases decid e d by three-justice panels, even changes in panel compositi o n could lead to doctrin a l shi fts. J ! ... ere are severa 1m port ar~t curos on uoct nnal cycnng m Delav1are corpo r ate law. Most importantly, several of the facto rs that make unanimity possible-the court's small size and the tendency to select justices with a similar perspective on corporate law 71 -greatly reduce the likelihood that the justices will have multipe aked preferences. Delaware justices can be expected to be sympathetic to publicly held corporations and their managers, for instance, rather than having the wide range of perspectives one sees on the Supreme Court and many other collegial courts.
72
T o the extent the justices ' perspectives are single-peaked as a result, cycling ·will simply not occur.
73
Even if the justices have relatively simil ar views as to the ge neral go als of corporate law, however, th eir preferences may neverth eless prove to be multipeaked.H Particularly vvith con -,. ; i. t is interesting to note in this regard that none of t he take ov er cases we have be en discussing were he ard en bane. This suggests that th e just ices did not view any of the case s as reco nsidering existing law, see De i. Sup. Ct. Intern al Op. P. VII(2) (req ui ring e n ba ne hearing of case that co uld mod ify o r overrule es tab lis hed case law), desp ite th e s hifts in th e cases, as deta il ed infra no te 75 , a fact th at is arg ua bl y attribu tab le to the malle ability of th e opinions. 70 T hi s question is a frequent a nd importa nt o ne in the socia l choice literat ure. For rev ie ws of the literat ure conside rin g the fact o rs tha t magni fy o r reduce th e likelihood of cyclin g, see Mue ll er, supra no te 47, at 81-82; R ik er, s upra note 47, at 123 -28. 71 See supra no tes 17-25 and accompan yin g tex t. 72 For an argume nt that the Supre me Cour t has become incre asingly multipeak ed in its preferences in recent d ecades, and th at it has used th e doctrine o f sta nding to counteract the risk of strategic manipulation by ideol og ica l litigants, see Stearn s, H isto ri cal Evidence, su pra note 50, a t 349-85. 73 Rike r, supra note 47, at 124. " Fo r a simil ar point about the ri sk of cycli ng a mon g sha re ho ld ers we re they given th e a uth ority to initi a te corpo ra te decisions o n th e ir own , see Gordo n , supra note 33 . Go rdon argues t ha t e ven if all of a firm's sh are ho lders were int e rested principally in wea ith maximiza ti o n, the y couid eas il y ha ve mul tipeak ed prefere nce s on the issue of troversial issues, and given that court composition or justices' perspectives may shift over time, the multipe akedness necessary to p recipitate a cycle or cycle -like effect can easily arise.
T he takeover cases reviewed in Section II. A are an excellent example. Even if the justices shared a similc.r view of the general role of directors in cor porate lavv , the d ifficul ty o f assimilating the takeover cases into Delaware's existing fi duciary duty fr amework could easil y lead to th e kinds of multipe aked views th at can produce doctrinal cycling. In fact , although we considered the cases in hypothetical form, they come quite close to embodying an unacknowledged cycle . 75 Moreover, in a sense , it does not matter · whether or not De laware corporate law has in fact cycl ed in any given are a.
76
An incomplete cycle, or a doctrinal shift in a contex t where the how bes t to achiev e th at go al. Id . at 359-85. In te restin gly, thi s po int may be e ven stro nge r with re spect to the justices of the supreme co urt, since th e ir views on co rpo ra te law a re unlik e ly to di still to a single perspec ti ve li ke wea lth m ax imi za tion . On the oth e r ha nd , th e ju sti ces obvi o usl y co mprise a dra ma ti cally sm a ll e r gro up , whi ch wo ul d te nd to reduce the lik e lih ood of mul t i pe ake d preferences. In Time -Warner the supre me co urt shi fte d dramatica ll y, and em ph asi ze d D irec to r D iscr e tio n. Tirne-W arner, 571 A .2d at 1153 . It al so m a de ge stures toward E nh a nced Scrutin y a nd Sha re hold e r Prerogative . Id . a t 1150, 1~154 .
Time-Warner thu s res e mbles C lar k's preferences (D D/ES/SP) .
F in a lly , the cou rt sh ifted to a much greater foc us o n Share holder Prerogative in QVC-e mphasizi ng the fact tha t th e proposed tra nsfer o f the target wou ld e limina te the share ho lders' voting auth ority within the firm . Q VC, 637 A.2 d a t 42.-45. QV C there fore loo ks some what like Baker's preference profil e (SP/DD/ES).
T h us, the fo ur key takeover cases ca n be seen as e mbod ying so m e thing li ke th e cycle we con si dered in th e last Secti o n. I hesi tate to ma ke thi s claim too strongly , because one could q ui bble with seve ra l aspects o f this characte rizat ion. A lth o ug h th e supreme co urt repea te dl y hig hli ghted the effect o f the proposed merger on share hold ers in QVC, see, e.g., su pra note 57 (quo ti ng statements fro m th e o pinion emp has izin g sha re holde rs ' p light ), it is n o t clear that the case ca n be said to have adopted Sharehold er Pre roga ti ve (o r a variation on this pe rspective) as its prin cipa l approach. W ha t is cl ear, howe ver, is tha t th e cases come qu ite close to a cycle und e r a ny characterization, and thus und erscore the poss ib ili ty tha t a cycle co ul d occur.
76 See supra note 62 and accompany ing text.
justices' preferences are actually unipeaked rather than multipe aked, can produce the same kinds of doctrinal opaqueness as might be caused by a true cycle. 77 In short, unanimity appears to contribute in important respects to doctrin al instability, both by exacerbating the risk of cycles and by otherwise clouding the development of corporate lavv doctrine .
'vV e have focused througho ut this Part, a.nd v.;ili continue to do so hereafter, on the effect that unanimity has on doctrinal de·-velopment through time-that is, we have focus ed on 3equ ences of cases, r ather than on a single case. Neverth eless, it is important to note th at just as un animity can increase doctrinal instability when the justices ' preferences are un ipeaked as well as when they are multipeaked, unanimity also may alter the justic~s' decisionmaking process within any given case.
This becomes immediately clear if we briefly consider the median voter theorem. The median voter theorem predicts that if decisionmakers' preferences are unipeaked, the outcome in a maj ority voting regime will gravitate toward the preferences of the median voter, since this individual 's vote is necessary to secure a majority. Under unanimity, by contrast, the need to bring even outlying voters within the fo ld suggests th at the median voter's perspective will not control. As a rough approximation , we might predict that unanimous voting will gravitate toward the mean of the justices' views.
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" See Go rdon , supra note 33, at 363 (simil a r point in the co ntext of shareh o lder in itiation ).
7 " See Mue ll e r, supra no te 47, at 64-66 (d escribin g m e di an voter theorem in bot h intuitive a nd qu a ntitativ e te rms). For an app licati on to bankruptcy , see Dav id A. Skeel, Jr., T he Nature and Effect of Co rporat e Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 Va. L. Rev. 461 ,480 n.69 (1992) (chapter 11 vo ting rul es focu s intluen ce o n residu al o wner, which is a nal ogo us in some respec ts to t he medi a n voter).
7 " I am grateful to Saul Levmore fo r suggest ing this point to me in con vers atio n. P e r haps th e best way to appreciate thi s di stincti o n b etwee n un a nimou s a nd no nun an imous reg imes is thro ugh an illustrat io n based o n o ur takeove r hypot he ti ca l. Ass um e that, rat he r than including three different app roach es , th e justices ' views e ntail o nl y two: E nhance d Scrutiny a nd Director Discretion. (Although I usc two ap proaches for s implicity, th e analysis co uld ho ld tru e e ven with three approaches , so long as th e approaches could be arrayed o n a sin g le-pe a k ed curve . Sin glepeakedn ess is d escribed in detail and shown graphically in Riker, supra note 47, at 124-28; see also Sau l Levmore, Parli a mentary Law, Major ity Decisi o nm a kin g, a nd the Voting Paradox , 75 Ya . L. Rev. 971 , 987 & n.47 (1989) (de scribin g sin g lepeakedness)). But th e justices a re nevert he less divid ed as to th e appropri a te Interestingly, however, the unanimity norm could have an even more dramatic effect on the justices' vievvs in some cases. If the outlying justice feel s particul arly strongly, and the o ther justices are wedded to preserving unanimity, the would-be ma-· jority justices might move cl ose r to, or even adopt, the outlyin g justice's perspective. State d in soci al ch oice terms, th e D elawa re supreme court's d isinclinati on to issue separate opin ions is likely to enhance the justices' ten dency to take the intensity of approac h, with A lden preferring a n aggress ive vers ion o f Enhanced Scrutiny , Baker prefe rrin g Enh a nced Scrutin y, but not so aggressive ly ap plied , a nd C la rk p r eferr ing D irector Discretion. Ass um e th a t the just ice s' perspectives ca n be port rayed in simplified form o n th e bar grap h t h at foll ows, wit h Alden 's view re prese nted by Po int A, Ba ker's by Point B , and Clark's by Point C:
En han ced Scrutiny
_ __ I __________ I_ Di rector Discretion
A B C
Co nsid e r first how things would pl a y out und e r a regim e th a t allowe d for se parate op ini ons. Beca use Baker's vote is n ecessa r y to ob tain a majority , th e m edian voter th eore m sugges ts th a t the o utcome wi ll re fl ect he r view, which is re presented b y Po int B . Und e r a un a nimity norm, by con trast, Baker's vi ew would not by itse lf co ntrol , since A ld e n a nd Baker wou ld ne e d to sec ure C la rk 's a pproval o f th e opin ion in t he case ; thus , they no longe r h ave th e luxury of simply ign oring Cl a rk' s vie w. In co nseq ue nce, we would exp ect th e justices to m ov e to a positi o n somewhe re to the right of Point B, in order to sec ure Cla rk 's vo te a nd a un a nim o us o pini o n. A lth o ugh it is un clea r how far to the right A ld e n and Baker will be requi re d to mov e, it seems lik ely th a t th e e ventual point will be somewh at closer to Point B t han to Po int C, s in ce a s hift to th e right of B requir es b o th A ld en a nd Bake r to alter their pos iti o ns. One p oss ibility , as note d in the text , is that the o utcom e in a unanimity regime may retlect the mea n of the justices' views, rather th a n th e m e dian view as in a majority voting regime. In th eo ry at least, if two of the justices are no t strongly committed to a particul ar o utcome, the distinctio n b e twee n unanimi ty a nd nonun a nimit y regim es could affect not only the justices' doctrinal pos ition , but eve n the outcome in so m e cases. Gra phi ca ll y, we can illu strat e this poss ibility with a vari at ion o n the chart used abov e :
Ass um e t hat 0 represents th e poin t whe re the o utcom e in th e case sh ifts , such tha t poi nts to the left of 0 e ntai l liabili ty , a nd po ints to the ri ght of 0 do no t. If u na nimit y wo uid lea d the justices to ad opt a positi o n to the ri ght of 0 , it could a lter the o utcome as compare d to a nonun a nimi ty regim e. As suggested abo ve, such a shift cou ld on ly occur if Alden an d Baker were not irrevoca bly co mmitted to findi ng li ab ility in th e case. In th e tex t that foll ows I suggest a noth er scen a rio where one jus tice's view co uld tip the ot he r two.
any particular judge's preference into account m the decision·k· 80 mak-mg process. Unanimity thus has a significant effect on the nature of judicial reviev;, both in any given case and across a court's case law. 1v1ost dram atically , unanimity can increase doctrinal instability. R ecognizing this leads us to yet anoth e r cruci al q uestion: Why has Delaware supreme court decisionmaking not only evolved toward unani mity, but also retained this attribute, despite its apparently problematic implications?
I attem pt to sort this out in the Parts that follovv, and in doing so suggest that the doctrinal instability encouraged by unanimity is not quite so p roblematic as it first appears . 'vVe will see by the time we complete Part IV that the outcomes in the cases are less unpredictable than the supreme court's doctrinal pronouncements.
III. WHAT LA WYERS HAVE To Do WITH IT: AN INTEREST GROUP EXPLANATION
Given the historical uses of unanimity, the most obvious explanation for D elaware's unanimity norm might be judicial credibility. Just as Chief Justice Marshall fostered unanimity to enhance the standing of the early Supreme Court,s 1 Delaware's unanimity norm could perhaps be explained as a m e ans for the court to solidify its standing as the nation's leading arbiter of corporate law issues. This might be part of the explanation, but as a full account, it is unsatisfying in many respects . It does not explain, for instance, why Delaware's supreme court, unlike the so To the extent this is true, the justices would in effect be cardinalizing their preferences, and thus relaxing their adherence to the "independence of irrelevant alternatives" postulate. Sec supra note 48 and accompanying text (describing Arrow's postulate). My suspicion is that something like this, which is analogous to logrolling in some respects, takes place to a certain extent in most collegial courts, and that unanimity magnifies the effect, given the added holdup power such a regime gives to an outlying judge. But even in a unanimity regime, it seems likely to come into play only on the margin. See generally Stearns, Misguided Renaissance, supra note 50, at 1225-26 n.18 (criticizing suggestion by Lynn Stout that judges can and should engage in logrolling). It is interesting to note that the Delaware supreme court's practice of prohibiting discussion among the justices about a case until immediately after oral argument, see Del. Sup. Ct. Internal Op. P. IX(l), reduces even the appearance of vote trading of the sort that takes place in legislatures.
81 See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
U.S. Supreme Court, has retained its unanimity norm even after having fully established its preeminence in corporate law. lVIy goal in the remainder of this Article is to provide a more nuanced explanation of the unanimity norm. I begin, in this Part, by considering wh at the interest group branch of public choice theory might h ave to say about the significance of unanimity.82 Because the interest group perspective ultimately proves incomplete, I add a ·;ery different perspective in the following Part, one which vvill return us to a variation on the issue of judicial credibility.
For our purposes, the central insight of interest group theory is that concentrated interest groups often can secure favorable legislation at the expense of more diffuse groups, due to diffuse groups' relative inability to organize effectively even when they have a great deal at stake.
8
' As the heading of this Part suggests, our eventual focus will be on the role of the Delaware bar (as well as on the justices themselves). T o appreciate the relationship between the bar and unanimity, however, we must first consider the interest group dynamic in corporate law more generally.
The interest group that appears to have most clout in the corporate law context is corporate managers, due to the fact that they usually choose the firm's state of incorporation.
84 Although " 2 A brief word on terminology at the o utse t. Many writers, particularly in the lega l literature, treat the terms ''public choice " and " interes t group theory" as synonymous, and as distinct from, though re lated to , "social choice. " I use " public choice " in its broader se nse, as a n umbrella term e nco mpass in g a va riet y of specific perspectives such as interest group the ory and social choice. This accords with the fact that each of the specific perspectives offers insights into the nature of " public" o r multi-party decisionmaking. "' For similar reasons, th e co rpo ra te lawyers who advise a firm al so a re key pl ayers commentators continue to dispute whether states generally, and D e laware in particul ar, are effective regulators of corporate law, 85 nearly everyone agrees that Delm:vare, and other states interested in kee ping or attracting corporations, res pond to managers when legisl ating on corporate l ir·.N . For Del aware , the spoils of victory a re the signific ant di rect and indirect payments a firm makes for th e privilege of being incorporated in Delaware.
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L ike the effort to attract corporations, the decision h ow to di vide the benefits of charter competitio n success may also be affecte d by inte rest group competition.87 This is where D elaware's lawyers come into the p icture . One of the indirect benefits of Delaware's charte r competition in the incorporation decision. Macey /l<.. M iller. supra note 35, at 486. Although th e managers' and lawyers' choice ordinarily is subj ect to shareholder approval, the choice is almost always approved. Commentators differ as to whether this reflects collective action problems in share holder decisionmaking, or a perception by the shareholders that the choice is in their best interests. ~5 The charter competition debate stems, in its recent incarnation, from William Cary's contention that states' efforts to lure corporatio ns into the state produce a " race-for-the-bottom, " see William L. Cary , Fede ra li sm and Corpora te Law: Retlect ions Upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J . 663 (1974) , and Ra lph Winter's response that market forces impel states to enact gene1ally efficient laws. See Ralph K Winter, Jr., State Law, Sharehold er Protection. and the T heory of the Corporation, 6 J. Lega l Stud. 251 (1977) . For a review of the de bate, and an application of simil ar insights to corporate bankruptcy regulation, see Da vid A . Skee l, Jr. , Rethinking the Line Be tween Corporate Law and Corpora te Bankruptcy, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 471 (1994) . 86 The most obvious direct payment is the franc hi se taxes corporations pay to Delaware. Roberta Romano has persuasivel y argued that Delaware's dependence o n these ta xes, which represent more than 15 % of De laware's tax revenues, see Romano, Genius, supra note 22, at 6-8 (co mpilin g data fro m 1960-1990), effective ly holds D elaware hostage, id. at 38-39, committing it to continued se nsitivity to the interes ts of co rporations. 87 In the interest group literature, the distinction between the interest groups that compete for legislation, and those that provide it, is often characterized in demandsupply terms. The groups that compete for legislation comprise the "demand" side. Those who provide the legislation and/or participate in the rents obtained from demand-side interest groups, such as Delaware's legislature and the Delaware bar, co mpri se the "suppl y" sid e. See Macey & Mill e r, supra note 35, at 471 (describing Delaware corporate law in these te rm s); Freel S. McChes ney, Rent Extraction and Inte rest-Group O rganiza tion in a C oasean Mode l of Reg ulation , 20 J. Legal Stud . 73 (1991) . Vol. 83:127 success 1s legal work for its corporate bar. Delaware's b ar clearly is an extraordinarily po werful group, and many o bservers beiieve that the bar parlays its in±l uence into legal rules that maximize fi rm s' use of Delaware lawye r s .~'
Notice that the an alysis thus far suggests only that Delaware's legislative process may ben efit both out-of--state corporate managers and (more im portantl y for our purposes) Delaware la\v-yers. The unanimity norm, on the other hand, is a ch aracteristic of D elaware's judici al pror.:-ess , and it is not immediately de ar whether the interests of the Delaware bar are also like ly to influen ce the state's supreme court. Although judges obviously are more isolated from interest group influences than legislators, De laware 's justices are likely to refl ect the interests of t he corporate bar. The most obvious source of sympathy is the judicial selection process. As described earli er, the Delaware bar plays a central role in selecting justices, and it can be expected to recommend individuals who have a natural affinity to the corporate bar. 89 This n atural inclination is amply borne out by even a cursory look at who is ordinarily selected to sit on the supreme court. Ne arly all of the justices, both currently and as a historical matter, were members of the Delaware bar before donning judicial robes.
90
A much-reported recent incident involving the selection process reinforces the point that Delaware's justices h ave reason to be sympathetic to the interests of local lawyers. D elaware's justices are typically reappoi nted as a matter of course. However , when Justice Andrew Moore 's twelve-ye ar term cam e to an end in early 1994, the nomination committee declined to submit his name to the governor as an acceptable choice. widely believed th at th e refusal to renominate IVIoore h ad li ttle to do with the qu ality of his d ecisionmaking--which was , and is, seen as highly competent-and eve rything to d o with his frequ ent belittling of the lawyers who appeare d before him .
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Assmning that Delaware 's j udici al process mi ght tend to
ben ent t1 e }e! awa re ar , tne next quest10n 1s wneL,er unammity itse lf has th is effect. F rom at l~::asL one perspective, it clearl y 1n e~ ~2
A~ n re h ave S"" P D <-hp · u, .,.,r:. n;~.-l;t ' no·r-, cn C::lD r ro~te a 1 oc C.~... ;).
• See, e .g ., R ic ha rd B . Schmitt, De laware Governor P icks T ri a l J ud ge fo r S u pre me Co urt, Wa ll St. J., May 26, 1994, at B7 (not ing a llegations th a t th e la w firm of Skadde n , Arps, Sla te, M eag h er & Flo m influe nced the o utco m e, a n d sta t ing th at " th e m a in case again st [Justi ce Moore] appea red to be t hat he was so metim es ve rba ll y ab usive to lawyers and in se nsit ive to their nee ds in sched ulin g hea rings.").
1t is important no t to o ve rge nc ra lize frOITJ t he Moore ex p e ri e nce, howev er. l do not mea n to suggest, for in sta nce, t hat D ela ware's just ices co nsciously take th e bar's int e res ts in to account. R a th e r, t he pr incip a l point is that the se lection p rocess wi ll ge nera11 y le ad to j ustices w ho a lready tend to sh a re t he ba r's perspective. Ne il Ko m esar m a ke s a simi lar point, which he refers to as th e "irre le van ce of mo tiv e ," with respect to the legisla ti ve process. See Neil K. Ko mcsar, Impe rfect A lt e rn a ti ves: C hoosi ng Institutions in Law, Eco nomics, and P ubl ic Po licy 58-65 (1994 ) .
9 ' T h is is no t to sa y th at the interest g roup anal;,s is persuasive ly describes why th e unanim ity norm h as d e ve lope d. I tak e up that iss ue, a nd exp ress several d o u b ts, at the end o f this Part. 93 The amount of liti gati o n nee d n ot be e no r m ous in abso lute terms to ge n e r a te a sign ifica nt benefit in D e la wa re, wh ich has a re lat ive ly sm a li bar. A few hi g h-pmfil e cases each year can b e ex pected to h ave a CJ'Jcial impact .
9 " See Mace y & M ill e r, supra no te 35, at 504 . 95 ! ass ume that b oth th e sh a re ho lder p la intiffs and d irect o r de fendants are li ke ly to be o ut-of-sta te beca use on ly a smail m inority of the sha re ho lde rs a nd di recto rs (and o th e r relev ant inte rest gro ups, such as e mpl oyees ) o f pub licl y he ld Deiawa re corpora tio ns ac tu all y res ide in De lawa re . See, e. g ., Rom ano, Ge niu s, s upra no te 22, [Vol. 83:127 ware counsel (rather than, say, engaging local counsel solely for the purpose of signing pleadings ).
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On inspection, various aspects of Delaware's judicial process-including, at le ast at first glance, the unanimity norm-can be seen as satisfying both of these prerequisites.
As fo r the decision where to file a la\vsuit, the Delaware legislature and judiciary have taken numerous steps that encourage the parties to bring litigati on in the state. For instance, Delaware makes it extremely easy to establish person al jurisdiction over any director of a D elaware firm, 97 and D elaware is notably generous in awarding fees to plaintiffs' attorneys. 93 Moreover, the judicial system as a whole-with a separate chancery court to address business issues and immediate appeal to the supreme court-is structured to assure judicial expertise and a streamlined decisionmaking process .
99
In the fas t-paced takeover battles of the 1980s, Delaware's judges developed a norm of hearing and deciding even the most complex cases in a remarkably expedited fashion-an obvious attraction to the plaintiffs in time-sensitive disputes .
100
T he remarkable degree of collegial interaction between Delaware's supreme court justices and the local bar gives outof-state litigants an incentive to rely on Delaware lawyers much more than they otherwise might. It usually pays to retain a lawyer who knows , and is known and respected by, the supreme at 60 (noting that most Delaware firms are located outside of Delaware). 06 Ribstei n, supra note 88, at 1011. 97 Under De l. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3114 (Supp. 1994) , Delaware directors are deemed to consent to person a l jurisdiction in Delaware. Section 3114 was drafted days after the S upreme Court struck down the prior jurisdictional provision as unconstitution al in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 214-17 (1977) . See Drexler, in
The Delaware Bar, supra note 17, at 597 (describing the change in method of obtaining jurisdiction).
98 See., e .g. , Rock, supra note 12, at 67 & tbl.2 (discussing Delaware fee awards in the management buyout cases).
99 See, e .g., Romano, Ge nius, supra note 22, at 39-40. 100 In particu larl y prominent cases, the Delaware supre me court often an nou nced its decision and issued an order explain in g the result short ly after oral argument, th en issued a fu ll written opinion thereafter. See, e.g ., Paramount Communicati o ns v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 36 n.1 (Del. 1993 ) (oral argument a nd initial order issued on Dec. 9, 1993; written opinion issued Feb. 4, 1994 ). Delaware's judicial efficiency is not limited to high profile corporate la w cases. Delaware 's justices disposed of their cases within an average of 24.9 days after submission in fiscal year 1995. Delaware A nnual Report, supra note 21, at 29.
court.
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The unanimity norrn m agnifies the value of the local bar. Because of the doctrinal uncertainty the norm creates, it is even more d ifficult than it might otherwise be for an out-of-state lawyer to gain an adequate sense of what the justices are up to simply by reading su preme court opinions.
Jln a very real sense, the local bar, together vvith several p ro minent New York la-vv fi r:rn.s that have made a similar ongoim:r investment in D elaware law. h as become a discrete commu- ----: mty o mterpre ters o . e1aw.c,:re corporate iav;. -Jcven 2 cursory glance through the promi nent takeover cases underscores this. lime afte r time, one sees the same fir ms representi ng p arties before the supreme court. In short, the interest group theory of regulation suggests tha t the unanimity norm may have evolved, or at least survived, because unanimity benefits the Delaware bar, and the Delaware supreme court has an incentive to respond to the bar's interests. Given that both it and the b ar have a strong stake in Delaware's continued primacy in corporate law, the court is unlikely to adopt measures that are sufficiently costly to corporations as to give them reason to reincorporate elsewhere.
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But unanimity does not seem likely to have such an effect, and thus the interest group explanation may appl y.
'While the interest grou p theory rings true in m any respects, it do es not by itself explain the unanimity norm . First, the benefits of the unanimity norm to the bar are not enormous, and the practices that foster unanimity entai l significant costs to the jus-10 1 T here is a si milar dynamic in the Supre me Court , wh e re a rel ati vely sm a ll Su preme Court bar trades on its expertise a nd familiarity with the Justices. As in De la ware, litigants have a strong incentive to turn to a me mber of this informal bar, rather than to use an outside attorney w1th iittl e or no ex pe rience in the Supreme Court. D ue to factors such as those suggested in the analysis belm-v, however, the incentive to use members of the De la ware bar is even stro nger than with the Supreme Court bar. For a fascinatin g study a nd discuss ion of the Supreme C ourt bar, tices. As we have discussed , D elaware supreme court justices spend significantly more time on an individual case than would be required if separate opini ons were the norm . G iven that th e justice s could , and in the view of some commentators do, look after the corporate bar in other ways at rnuch lower cost, 1 ()4 it see ms unlikely th at solicitude for the bar offe rs the final word on the unani mity norm. Second, in addition to the worklo ad costs just m entioned , unanimity im poses an other kind of cost o n D elaware's justices-it limits each justice's opportuni ty to develop an individual reputati on. It is much more difficult for a justice to establish an individual voice when she has few opportuniti es to spe ak separately.
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Together these cast significant doubt on the suggestion that unanimity developed, or h as survived , primarily to benefit Delaware's corpor ate bar.
Thus, we still lack a complete expl an ation of the unanimity norm. To move closer to this goal, we need to consider another important, and underap preciated, characteristic of Delaware supreme court decisionmaking.
100 An e xampl e comm e nta to rs fr eq ue ntl y po int to is S mi th v. V an G ork o m, 488 A .2d 858 (De l. 1985) , a nd othe r ca ses that have e mp hasize d th e im po rt a nce th e co urt pl aces on directors ha ving receiv e d expe rt advice fr o m la wyers and inv estment b a nkers. Mace y & Mill e r, supra no te 35 , a t 517-1 9. A lth o ugh It is de ba tabl e ho w far th e interes t gro up expl a nati o n goe s in ex pl a inin g ev en th ese sta tem e nts-a fter a ll , lega l and inv e stme nt banker op inion s presumably do imp rove directors' de cisi onmaking precess-th e state me nts cost th e court little a nd pro vide obvious b en e fits to profession a ls.
105 Thi s point ass um es that judicial reputa tion is a n imp o rtant motiv a ting fa ctor fo r judges, as I beli eve it is-pa rti cularl y o n a nati o na l co urt o f las t re so rt such as th e Supreme Court or, for corporate Jaw issu es, th e D e laware supreme court. Judge Pos ner has suggested th a t "ordinary" judges (such as mos t fed e ra l circuit judges) are m o tivate d Jess by reputa tion o r e ve n pres tige than by a ta ste fo r voting and by th e utility th ey gain from their role as e ngage d "s pectators " of a case . Richard A . Pos ner , W hat D o J udges and Ju stices Ma xim ize? : (T he Same T hing E ve rybo dy Else Does), 3 Sup. C t. Econ. Rev. 1 (19 93 ). T hi s se e ms de ba tabl e as a ch a racte rization e ven of " ordinary" judges. But it is interesting to no te th at un a nimity would seem to re d uce th e utilit y of vo ting to th e ex tent it !imits a judge 's a bility to fully e xpress hi s o r her voting pre ferences. Thus, th e defection co ncern s I di scuss below would b e re levant eve n for Po;,n e r's mod e l.
IV. THE MORAL DIMENSION OF DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW
U nder the standard view of Del aware judicial dccisionmaking, which I have assumed in the an alysis to this poin t, th e una-. . ' bl" f . . f mnuty norm nas trou mg consequences :or tne cons1stency o corporate law. The standard view suggests tha t lawyers and commentators should focus on the rules that the suDrerne court ' an nounces in its cases, and should attempt to reconciie the court's seemingly inconsistent doctrin al pronouncements. j ()" On this view, the unanimity norm is anything but benign, since it b , . . . . ,.
~ , D l 1 appe ars to exacer ate tne: mstabmty or tn e 1 e ;:rvvare c:ase wv.;--an inst ability which makes it all but hopeless to shoehorn the supreme court's doctri nal pronouncements into a singie coherent account.
Yet it is far from clear that the traditional perspective accurately describes what Delaware's justices ·are doing when they decide a corporate law dispute. A closer look suggests a differen t perspective on Delaware corporate law, one which gives rise to a richer and more benign account as to why the unanimity norm evolved in the supreme court.
As Edward Rock has pointed out (in part through a careful analysis of the Delaware cases involving management buyouts), Delaware opinions have several striking characteristics that are largely ignored in the traditional account. 583 (1994) (contend ing that the cases emphas ize a "contingent a llocation of power" to the directors of a corporation ) . Not s urprisingly , none of these efforts ca n fully e xp lain the cases.
107 Rock , supra no te 12; see al so Edward B. Rock, Preaching to Managers, 17 J. Co rp. L. 605 (1992) (reviewing Louis Lowenst ein , Sense a nd Nonsense in Corporate F inance (1991)). Elsewhe re, I ha ve argued for a somewhat analogous a pproach to Delaware law. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Saul and David and Corpora te Takeover Law (July 1995) (unp ubli shed manuscript on file with the Virginia Law Review Associat io n). Th e a nalysis of the Time-Warner and QVC decisions that follows is drawn in part from , a nd further devel o ps, a similar discu ss ion in that article.
Virginia Lmv l""<evie1v [Vol. 83:127 opinions are remark ably na:crat( ve in torm, and tend to include an extended account of the events that gave rise to the parties' dispute . tor our purposes, the extended narrative and the elaborate doctrinal analysis are particularly noteworthy given
• ~ l the tena ency ror courts m omer 1 -lnamrnJ\.Y regimes LO evo ve toward short, per curiam o pinions th at offer only the most general reasons for the decision.
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Second, the court 's narratives le ave little doubt as to which parties have or have not acted appropriately-that is, of whom the court c1oes and does n ot apnrove .
• I refer to these tendencies throughout this part as the "moral ~1 .
.
h mmens10n m , eiaware corporate ,avv. · Ji.n 1ocusmg on t e moral dime nsion, I do not mean to suggest that doctrine is irrelevant to the supreme court's decisionm aking process. Rather, I contend that doctrine is subsumed by, and in some respects subordinated to, the supreme court's quasi-m o r al, narrative assessments of whether the directors of a corporation have or h ave not generally honored their directorial obligations .
0
There is evidence of the moral characteristics I have described in almost every takeover case. The Time-Warner 111 and OVC 112 cases offer particularly striking illustrations. In order to
s Se e, e.g. , Easterbrook, s up1 a not e 32 , at 810 n .23 (unanimity in continental courts tends to "reduce [) th e opinion to a stri ng of homilies"); G in sburg, supra note 7, a t 134 (noting t he French practice of iss uin g a single, unanimous opinion, and stat ing th at those opinions are written in a "formal, impersona l, concise , stylized manner. " ).
109 One might a lso spe ak in terms of the "narra ti ve dimens ion" of t he De la ware case law. I use " moral" rath er t han "n arrative" in order to e m p h as ize the quasimora l ton e of the supreme court's factual na rratives. 110 My account of the mora l dim e nsion in the De iawa re case law ca ll s to mind the " literary" mo del o f judging developed by Martha 1'\ussbaum, who suggests that j ud ges s hould act as idea l "spectators," conducting a particularized, yet appropriat e ly detached, examination of the parties ' circumstances. See, e .g. , Martha C. Nussb aum, E quity and IVIercy, 22 P hil. & Pub. Aff. 83 (1993); 1v1artha C. Nussb aum, Poe tic J ustice: T he L ite rary Imagin a tion and Pubi ic Life 72-77 (1995); Mart h a C. Nussbaum, P oets as Judges: Judicia l Rhetoric and th e Literary Imagination, 62 U. Chi . L. Rev. 1477 (1995 . One difference between my analy sis and Nussbaum's approC~ch is that N ussba um has tended to focu s exclusively on the parties in the case a t hand , rather than on the in structive value of a court's opinion for future parties. As will become clear bel ow, I bel ie ve the Delaware supreme court deci sions take both current and future parties into consideration . The Delaware supreme court upheld the Time directors' actions. In addition to concluding that the directors' Revlon duties were never triggered , the court adopted an exp ansive view of the " threats" that woul d justify directors' use of defe nsive measures to stymie an un wanted takeover bid u nder Unocal. The court concluded tha t a Paramount takeover was a threat to Time's "culture." This, coupled with the possibility that T ime's shareholders wo uld be misled by th e bi d , we re adequate reasons for the directors to stonewall Paramoun t. 
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From a doctrinal perspective, Time-~Varner and QVC are extremely difficult to reconcile.m A s a result, most commentators view OVC as embodying a doctrinal shift. If we focus on the supreme court's quasi-moral narrative accounts of the directors ' performance in the two cases, however-that is, on the moral dimension of the cases-the divergent outcomes seem less surthe stock o f the co mbi ned company. and thus a co ntro lling inte rest. Even so, the court he ld that this was not enoug h to trigge r Revlon dutie s. Time-Warner, 571 A .2d at 1149-54. '' 8 QVC, 637 A.2d at 38 . O ne of the ironies of Time -Wa rn er and QVC is that Para mo unt not only was inv o lv ed in both cases, first as the hos tile bidder and then as th e target, but that it also lost in the supre me court both times . '~' T he most pe rsuasive attempt to do so, in my vi ew, is Marcel Kahan's characte ri zation o f th e takeo ver cases as entailing a "contin ge nt allocat ion of a uth ority" to the directors of a corpora tion. See Ka han, supra note 106 . But even this vi ew must stretch to reconcii e Time -Warner a nd QVC. Thus , to explain th e success of Time's directors a nd fai lure of Paramount's, t he a pproach e mp hasizes th e fac t th at Time's shareholders theoret i c~{lly couid have received a takeover pre mium ev en a fter the Time-Warner merger, whe re as Para mount' s share ho lders would ha ve lost a ny chance of a subseq ue nt ta keove r premi um once Sumner Redstone of V iacom too k co ntro l. Id. at 596. T hi s is true, but th e p rospect o f a subsequent cha nge in co ntrol with Time-Warn er was much mo re theore ti cal than real, give n th e size of the co mbin e d compan y and its e normous debt load.
Unanim ity N orm
prising even in the face of doctrinal instability.
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Consider how different Time-lVa:-n er and OVC begin to look if we put doctrine to the side and fo cus on the moral dimension of the opinions . In Tim e-Warne r, T ime' s directors' refusal even to consider the Paramo unt b id cle arl y was problematic, but it was a single aberration in wh at the su prem e court characterizes · 1" J ..
• .. , .. <~ -r h • . , as tne mrectors oU1erw1se acrrnratHe p er to rmance or t 1e1r a uties. For instance , th e directors h ad consid ered several o ther fi rms carefully, includ ing P aramount , b efore choosing 'vVarne r. As th.e court underscores , thei r consideration was given long before Paramount m ade its last min ute bid.l 22 T hough superficially similar, the actions of Paramount's direc--tors are portrayed very differently in QVC. Chief Justice Veasey's opinion in OVC leaves no dou bt that Paramount's decisionmaking process was largely a charade, designed to disguise the directors' failure to honor their responsibilities as directors. For instance, although P aramount's directors characterized their merger wi th Viacom as part of a long-term plan, the supreme court points out that the negotiations had a relatively recent genesis.m Moreover, Paramount's directors never seriously considered whether a combination with QVC would make sense. Quite to the contrary, a chief objective of their actions seemed to be to excl ude QVC from the nrocess at all costs. 12 _. The Para-_ , mount directors ' abdicati on of their responsibilities required the supreme court to ste p in, in contras t to the deference it accorded T ime's directors in the Time-01 arner case.
Focusing on the moral dimension of D elaware decisionmak-ing thus provides a mu ch more satisfying account of the decisions in Time -VVarner and OVC than doctrine alone. It also raises an important question: Is my emphasis on the supreme court's role as moral arbiter sim ply another way of saying that the justices decide •.vhat they think the outcome shoul d be and slan t the facts to supuort fhei r conclusion ?
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Could not the Given the fact-sen sitive nature of the take over cases, Delaware 's justices clearly co uld do just this . Yet it is also clear that the justices see themselves as doing much more than playing games with facts . If the justices were principally concerned wi th defending an intuitive conclusion, they could easily achieve this wi th a brief, selective presentation of facts together with an application of takeover doctrine. T he opinions take an altogether different tack. A s I have already noted, they provide a remarkably detailed narrative of the events surrounding each dispute , so that the case becomes an extensive story about the parties' interactions. 126 The clear implication is that the story of the case is intended to be instructive , to illustrate 'Nhat appropriate or inappropriate directo rial behavior "feels " like.
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B. Unanimity and the A1oral Dimension
Reconceptualizing corporc.te law in moral terms has seve ral im portan t impiications for our analysis of Delaware's unanim ity norm . T he firs t is that it suggests doctrinal cycling m ay not be so 2:rave a concern as might otherwise be the case . tive has similar explanatory power in each of the suprenv;; ' . ,_ l'l court s promment taKeover cases .~ Recognizing the moral dimension of the Delaware cases has a seco nd crucial implication: It helps to explain why Delaware decisionmaking has evolved toward unanimity. Far more than a regime characterized by separate opinions, unanimity reinfo rces the supreme court's effectiveness as moral arbiter-that is , in illuminating how directors ought to act. If the court regularl y issued separate opinions, the justices' internal disagreem ents would dil ute the impact of the court's pronouncements, and suggest uncertainty as to the parameters of appropriate directorial behavior. m B y speaking instead with a single voice , the justices send a very different message , one that suggests that the full authority of the court stands behind the conclusi ons th at they reach as to appropriate and inappropriate directori al be-· havl ." r t.; 3 ._,A o
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Fo r a n extended an a lysis of the De laware supreme court's (and chan cery cou rt's) management bu yo ut cases in these terms , see Rock, supra note 12.
t.'~ G ive n the norm of unanimity, the issuance of a 5eparate opinion has a powe rful sig nailin g e ffect , since it hints a t deep disagreement on the court in those fe w cases whe re a justice does write se parately. This is particularly tru e if the separa te o pini on ch a ll e nges the majority 's factual narrative, rather than simply regist e ring a di sagree me nt on a procedural or doctrinal point. See generally Paul G e wirtz, Narrativ e and Rhetoric in th e Law, in Law's Stories: Narrativ e and Rhetoric in th e Law 2, 11 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (multiple opinions conta ining diverge nt factual narratives undermine the credibility of any part icular accoun t o f rea lity). Fo r a rare illustration in the Delaware case Jaw, see Smith v. Van Gork o m , 488 A. 2d 858,893-98 (1985) (McNei ll y, J., dissenting) (ext e nded recharacterizati o n o f facts und e rl ying decision wh ere majority held directors to hav e breached th e ir dut y of care) .
t.'> Thi s d o es not mean th a t the s upreme court's standards e merge instantl y. As
Vi rginia Law R eview [Vol. 83: 127 judici al insecurity has contributed to the moral tone of the cases , one would expect the moral dimension to be strongest in a time o f particular concern about credibility. This in fact appears to be true. Th e moral dimension in the Delaware case law became most pronounced in the ta keover decisions we have been conside ring , starting in the mi d-1980s. T he 1980s were a time of particular concern for Delaware, in vi ew of the repeated calls for a federal response to the takeove r phenomenon. \;Vhen we combine the analysis of th is Part with the an al ysi s of the previous Parts, what emerges is a complex picture of the role that unanimity plays in Delaware corporate law.
'
6 The interest group analysis, th ou gh problem atic, partially explains the emergence of the unanimity norm. But in order to more fully explain th e norm, we need to consider the moral dime nsion in D el av;are corporate law, and the importance of unanimity to the co urt 's role in fostering appropriate directorial behavior. However persuasive the accou nt I have developed may be, it is also important not to forget a far more basic factor-Delaware's justices shoulder the added costs of unanimity because they take their responsibilities as justices very seriously, and because the legal culture in Delaware rei nforces this. 6 A s th e compl exity o f th e norm suggests, Delaware's penchant for unanimity is ne ith er obvi o usly e ffici ent or o bvi o usly inefficient. The recent lit erature on norms suggests that e ffici e nt no rms are like ly to eme rge in groups th a t are characterized by repeated interacti o n and which internalize the effects of a norm , see, e.g., Robert D . Coo ter, Dece ntralize d Law for a Complex Economy: T he Structural A pproach to Adjudicatin g the New Law Merchant, 144 U. Pa . L. Rev. 1643, 1657-64 (1 996), whereas th e ab ility to externa lize costs and fact o rs such as cognitive distort ions can le ad to in e fficient norms, see, e.g. , Eric A. Posn e r, Law, Eco nomics and Ine fficient Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Re v. 1697 Re v. , 1711 Re v. -25 (1996 . A lthough Delaware's de pend e nce o n attractin g corporations suggests th a t the court must internalize the consequences of the un animity norm , there is li ke ly to be sufficient slack to e nabl e it to be nefit De laware constituenci es, as we saw in Part III. 137 Th is was re peatedl y e mphasized to me in m y conve rsati ons with severa l Del aware justices. s we ave seen, ~ · e1aware s unamm1ty norm sneas nnportant light on the nature of Delaware corporate law. First, focusing on unanimity and the effect it may have on doctrinal cycling helps to explain why the D elaware case law, which. commentators repeatedly characterize as stable and certain, has at times appeared to be anything but stable and certain. Our consideration of why D el<l'Nare's supreme court has m ai ntained a unanimity norm offers additional insights, suggesting that the unanimity norm provides some support for a lawyer-centered perspective, and much more support for a moral perspective on Delaware coruorate lavv .
. t
More generally, the analysis has highlighted some of the effects of unanimity on judicial decisionmaking. In addition to magnifying the likelihood of doctrinal cycling, and producing analogous effects even in the absence of a true cycle, unanimity is likely to significantly alter the decisionmaking process within any given case. -~he analysis underscores just how differently unanimous and nonunanimous courts behave, both within each case and across doctrines such as those that have been the focus of this Article.
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